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The recent outset of European Monetary Integration with the introduction of a unique
currency and a full centralization of monetary policy together with the increasing
integration of global capital markets, stimulated a large body of research on monetary 
policy rules. Since Lucas’ critique, the need to find rules which are at the same time
simple and accountable has been a first goal for researchers and policy makers. In
fact, policy can be effective only if it is credible. Credibility is enhanced thorough the 
adoption of simple, accountable monetary policy rules. However, the big question is:
what kind of rules ? 
This paper tries to address the critical aspects in monetary policy modelling with a
special emphasis to Euro-Enlargement. 
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The recent outset of European Monetary Integration with the introduction of
a unique currency and a full centralization of monetary policy together with
the increasing integration of global capital markets, stimulated a large body of
research on monetary policy rules.
Since Lucas’ critique, the need to ﬁnd rules which are at the same time simple
and accountable has been a ﬁrst goal for researchers and policy makers. In fact,
policy can be eﬀective only if it is credible. Credibility is enhanced thorough
the adoption of simple, accountable monetary policy rules. However, the big
question is: what kind of rules ?
The main conclusion from the recent body of research are:
1. From the empirical point of view, a Taylor rule where nominal interest rate
is set as reacting to inﬂation and output, performs well over the sample
1982-1999, for data on US economy in most models presented in the book.
2. The ﬁtting performance can be improved by raising the coeﬃcient on inﬂa-
tion and output targeting (or output-gap targeting).
∗Correspondence Address: 2, Piazza Scaravilli, 40126 Bologna, Italy. Voice: ++39-051-
2098019; Fax: ++39-051-2098040; e-mail: marzo@economia.unibo.it.
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3. Simple rules with few lags perform better than more complicated policy
rules, with many lags.
4. The inclusion of an inertial element for the interest rate makes interest rate
to perform better than standard, simple Taylor rules.
Many of these papers have recently become an important benchmark for re-
search in monetary economy. However, there are many aspects that deserve a
full discussion. This paper tries to address the critical aspects in moetary policy
modelling with a special emphasis to Euro-Enlargement.
2. Monetary Policy Modelling: distinguishing Features
Many of the models of the recent literature share the inclusion of monopolistic
competition and stress the importance of nominal rigidities. The wide appli-
cability of the framework here considered makes possible the reconciliation of
two diﬀerent school of thought, the Neoclassical Macroeconomics and the neo-
Keynesian Macroeconomic.
As discussed by Goodfriend and King (1997), the New-Neoclassical Synthesis
reduced very much the ideological content of macroeconomic modelling. In
fact, in a well microfounded Real Business Cycle (RBC, henceforth), money is
considered together with several form of stickiness. The traditional RBC models
focused only on technological shocks as the main source of economic ﬂuctuations.
The advantage of RBC modelling framework is to have a sound microfounded
framework, in a general equilibrium context. In traditional RBC models there
is no role at all for monetary stabilization policies and the absolute price level
is completely irrelevant for resources allocation, which instead depend only from
relative prices.
In the recent past, research on monetary policy identiﬁcation on the empir-
ical grounds achieved remarkable successes, especially after the introduction of
VAR modelling. Moreover, the performance of many central banks around theChallenges for Monetary Policy and the Enlarged Euroland 3
world has fully succeded in achieving a stable and low inﬂation rate. Despite
this, the theoretical ground did not achieve any success in constructing a model
on which - at least in principle - everybody could count when formulating pol-
icy recommendations. This situation has produced an important dichotomy
between central bank practice and theoretical work that makes the urgency of
being closed up. The type of model that the scientiﬁc community is looking for is
necessarily a mixture between RBC elements and traditional Keynesian models.
Old-fashioned Keynesian Theory considers a set of mechanical reaction function
of wage and prices to some measures of market disequilibrium. After the Lu-
cas critique, this procedure has been harshly criticized because of the intrinsic
instability attached to such structural relationships. The modelling framework
adopted in the new model generation considers an explicit microfoudation for all
the stickiness phenomena. Prices and wages - although sticky - are optimally set
after the maximization of a given criterion function by the decision makers who
are in charge to set them. This type of nominal rigidities is generally modelled in
a way that includes a form of forward-looking behavior, by allowing the response
of prices to expectations about the future and the current state of the economy.
Obviously, the presence of those assumptions, opens up new questions in
terms of optimality of the chosen policy rule. In particular, the presence of
monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities includes an explicit source of
distortion in the model. In general, monetary authority aims to stabilize an
appropriately deﬁned price index. In fact, the instability of the general price
index causes substantial real distortions, ampliﬁed by the presence of monopolistic
competition and nominal stickiness. For these reasons, it is highly desirable to
construct rules which could be able to deliver a stable and low inﬂation rate.
In general, the type of monetary policy rules here considered has two main
targets: inﬂation and output. As a measure for output, almost all the authors
consider the output gap, given by the diﬀerence between the actual (observed)Challenges for Monetary Policy and the Enlarged Euroland 4
output and the level of output associated to the full employment equilibrium (the
potential output). The deﬁnition of the output gap is very problematic, indeed.
In fact, from the theoretical point of view the level of potential output is the
level of output reached by an economy without rigidities or distortions. How-
ever, the steady state level of actual output is not Pareto optimal. If prices are
not constantly adjusted, the instability of the price level generates discrepancies
between relative prices, creating an ineﬃcient sectorial allocation of resources.
It becomes clear, then, why a strong concern toward inﬂation stabilization often
implies also output stabilization. In order to clarify these issues, it is strictly nec-
essary to adopt a sound welfare criterion through which it is possible to compare
the various policy conﬁgurations.
3. The Design of Nominal Rigidities
Nominal rigidities can be considered under the form of both price and wage
rigidities. Essentially, in the current literature have been proposed four methods
for introducing price rigidities1:
a. Staggered Price Setting;
b. Calvo Method of Price Adjustment, as in Calvo (1983).
c. Menu Costs approach, based on quadratic cost of price adjustment à la
Rotemberg (1982).
d. State-dependent pricing, as in King and Wolman (1999).
The literature on monetary policy rules of which the contribution contained in
the book edited by Taylor are a good example, concentrated on the Calvo method
of price adjustment. This method is based on a very simple principle: the
1In what follows, the discussion will be mainly focused on price rigidities. Wage stickiness is
introduced via similar methods. See infra.Challenges for Monetary Policy and the Enlarged Euroland 5
number of ﬁrms changing price after a speciﬁc shock, is predetermined. So, each
ﬁrm changes her prices without knowing if it will belong to the set of changing
or that of non-changing ﬁrms. The optimal price choice is done intertemporally,
via the maximization of the expected proﬁt function.
The quadratic cost approach is also known as menu cost approach and eval-
uates the cost of changing the price in terms of output. This approach has been
introduced by Rotemberg (1982), and successively extended to a full general equi-
librium framework by Kim (2000), Ireland (1997). Other than the menu costs
interpretation, sometimes too restrictive, the recent contributions of this branch
of literature tend to consider this approach as the cost suﬀered by each ﬁrm after
a price change, due to the nexus of complex relationships entertained by a ﬁrm
with his customers (advertisements, announcements, reputation cost, and so on).










From (1) the cost of price adjustment PACjt for ﬁrm producing good j,i sa
quadratic deviation of the growth rate of prices set by ﬁrm j and the overall
inﬂation rate, Yt is the level of output. In (1), φp is a parameter describing
the magnitude of the cost of price adjustment: higher φp,s m o o t h e rw i l lb et h e
price level. According to (1), each ﬁrm pays a cost when growth rate of his
product prices diﬀeres from the aggregate inﬂation rate. The traditional menu
cost approach is obtained with π =1 .
Probably, the closest approach to the empirically observed behavior of ﬁrms,
collected via micro data is the state-dependent pricing: the price changes occurs
only after the occurrence of a particular state of the economy. The only paper
dealing with this approach has been written by King and Wolman (1999). De-
spite this, however, the level of analytical complexity involved by state-dependent
pricing is so high that, there is no consensus so far on the concrete applicabilityChallenges for Monetary Policy and the Enlarged Euroland 6
of this approach in a general equilibrium framework with a large real side.
Operationally, the most widespread adopted methods are (b) and (c). It is
diﬃcult to identify which methods among (b) and (c) could be the best for mod-
elling nominal rigidities. The Calvo method is closer to the empirical evidence
collected from micro data. However, the menu cost approach via equation (1)
has the advantage of being very tractable, and probably more easily interpretable
along a new approach, which I call here the ‘informational approach’. As stressed
by Zbaracki et al. (2000) the beneﬁts from infrequent price changes do not come
necessarily from a lower menu cost, but with the information associated to the
cost of changes. Some authors, as Woodford (2002), for example, interpret this
as an argument in favor of the adoption of a price setting mechanism indepen-
dent upon current market conditions. However, what it is crucial is that prices
are sticky in reaction to a speciﬁc shock. In fact, the information-based ar-
gument outlined by Zbaracki et al. (2000) and extended by Sims (1998) stress
the fact that the evolution of prices is sticky because of the existence of strong
informational problems, as I will discuss later on.
A crucial element considered by this modelling framework is given by the
interaction between pricing decision among diﬀerent price setters captured by
the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated goods θ. This interaction
can be well described by a game between suppliers of diﬀerent goods. Thus,
given aggregate demand, the spending decisions of a single agent i with respect to
others agents are said to be strategic complements if the increase in price charged
by other’s goods makes i-th agent to raise the price of i-th good. Pricing decision
are said to be strategic substitutes if, after an increase in prices of other’s goods,
agent i-th decides to lower the price of its goods.
In order to obtain strategic complementarity, Woodford (2002) shows that it
is necessary to have an high level of elasticity of substitution across diﬀerenti-
ated goods together with an high level of intertemporal elasticity of substitutionChallenges for Monetary Policy and the Enlarged Euroland 7
across goods2, σ. On the other hand, the presence of strategic substitutability
explains why in some papers (an example is Ohanian, Stockman and Killian,
1995), monetary policy has scarce eﬀects on aggregate activity.
3.1. Information and sticky prices. Overall, the models considered so far
in this literature suﬀer of a serious shortcoming in designing nominal rigidities:
they do not properly take into account the role of the informational factors. It
should be reminded, in fact, that the theoretical microfoundations of the Phillips
curve were mainly based on search and signal extraction problems. The recent
informal evidence collected by Zbaracki et al. (2000) show that a crucial element
for stickiness is the role of the costs related with the information processing.
Models with nominal rigidities replicates - under speciﬁc assumptions - some
qualitative facts empirically observed: small eﬀects of ﬁscal and monetary policies
and sluggish reaction of all the variables of the system, to a speciﬁcs h oc k . M od e l s
based on the mechanism on nominal rigidities designed so far, should be intended
as a proxy for better frameworks which should properly consider the limited
information processing capability intrinsic in each agent. The main characteristic
of many goods and labor markets of the more advanced economies is given by
the high heterogeneity of products and labor services supplied, associated to
occasional purchasers. This makes the perception of the aggregate price level a
non trivial task.
In fact, in a single interval of time, each agent has limited amount of time and
energy to be employed in processing a large quantity of economic information.
This situation makes for each agent convenient to keep prices ﬁxed over time.
The focus here is not on the information technology available to each agent: it is
the physical limit on the rate of information transfers that generates inertia.
For this reason, the model with quadratic cost of price adjustment à la Rotem-
berg, probably represents at best this informational processing cost. In fact, the
2Parameter σ can be also intended as the reciprocal of the risk-aversion coeﬃcient.Challenges for Monetary Policy and the Enlarged Euroland 8
presence of equation (1) well represents the sluggish - not ﬁxed or predetermined
- response of prices to exogenous shocks.
A shortcoming shared by all the papers collected in the volume edited by J.
Taylor is the scarce attention given to wage rigidities. The reasons to incorpo-
rate also wage rigidities are at least two: (1) in order to generate the so called
‘liquidity’ eﬀect; (2) to add an additional source of stickiness into the model and
making it closer to the empirical evidence. The ﬁrst reason has to do with
the observed short-run relationships existing between nominal interest rates and
monetary aggregates; after an expansionary (contractionary) monetary policy
shock, the nominal rate is observed to decrease (increase). The ﬁrst genera-
tion of monetary models3, did not succed in replicating this empirical feature.
Only with Kim (2000) the liquidity eﬀect was obtained in a general equilibrium
framework via a proper combination of nominal and real rigidities, with wage
rigidities modelled with quadratic cost of wage adjustments (according to menu
cost approach) and real rigidities considered as cost of adjusting capital. So, only
the presence of a substantial degree of sluggishness can potentially generate a set
of response patterns of variables close to the empirical regularities, documented
by VAR literature: the largest eﬀect on real variables can be observed only 4-5
quarters after a shock realization.
The presence of wage rigidities is the key assumption at the core of the tra-
ditional short run Keynesian theory. However, the presence of wage stickiness
only (without price rigidities) disagrees with the empirical evidence collected via
VAR studies (see, for example, Sims,1998), where it is found that real wages are
mildly procyclical in response to identiﬁed monetary policy disturbances. This
phenomena has been recorded at least since Dunlop (1938) and Tarshis (1938),
in the ﬁrst organized criticism to orthodox Keynesian Theory. Thus, after an
expansionary monetary policy shock, with ﬁxed nominal wage, theory would pre-
3One example of this literature is, among others, Cho and Cooley (1995).Challenges for Monetary Policy and the Enlarged Euroland 9
dict a reduction of real wage, due to the increase in the aggregate price level.
However, the evidence collected shows that real wage is mildly procyclical, so
it will tend to increase after an expansionary monetary policy shock. This in-
dicates that sticky prices should accompany sticky wages in a careful modelling
framework. The presence of sticky prices only (with ﬂexible wages) is in contrast
with the empirical evidence, because it implies a too sharp decline in real wages,
after a monetary tightening.
Tractable ways of modelling wage rigidities have been proposed by Sbordone
(2001), Woodford (2002) where nominal wages evolve according to a Calvo adjust-
ing method, properly modiﬁed. An alternative way of modelling this is given by
the quadratic cost of wage adjustment, as outlined in Kim (2000). This method,
which is based on a proper modiﬁcation of equation (1) is probably more tractable
from the analytical point of view, and it gives very good analytical results.
In any case, however, it is possible to show that despite the joint operation of
wage and price rigidities, much work remains to be done with respect to proper
design of the kind of rigidities to be included in the model4.
4. Monetary Policy Rules
The types of monetary policy rules here discussed fall within the class of so called
‘Taylor Rules’. The Taylor Rule is a particular monetary rule which sets nominal
interest rate as reacting to inﬂation and real output. The nominal rate included
in the rule is normally the short term interest rate directly controlled by Central
Bank, which, for the United States is the Federal Funds Rate.













φyj (yt−j − y∗)+ηt (2)
4Other source of stickiness take into account habit formation phenomena, as in Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (2001).Challenges for Monetary Policy and the Enlarged Euroland 10
where it is a measure for the nominal interest rate in period t and employed
by monetary authority as instrument, πt is the (gross) inﬂation rate between t
and t − 1,d e ﬁned as πt = Pt/Pt−1. Moreover, yt indicates the level of output
gap and ηt represents an exogenous monetary policy shock. In (2), i∗, π∗ and
y∗ indicate the targets for nominal interest rate, inﬂation rate and output gap,
respectively. In particular, the representation of monetary policy rule adopted in
(2) encompasses both forward and backward-looking rules: T0
π (T0
y) indicates the
number of forward lags for inﬂation rate (output gap), while Tπ (Ty)i st h en u m b e r
of backward lags for inﬂation rate (output gap). According to (2) nominal rate
controlled by Central Bank, changes according to the past history of the inﬂation
rate, nominal rate itself and output gap , and depends as well upon the forecasted
values for the inﬂation rate and output.
The advantage of a rules like (2) is that they depend upon only a small number
of parameters, making analyses and comparisons quite appealing under several
respects.
A possible way to evaluate monetary policy rules is to test whether they
deliver a determinate equilibrium or not. Indeterminacy of the rational expecta-
tions equilibrium is always non-desirable because of the presence of several forms
of rigidities which create lots of additional distortions. In order to prevent an
indeterminacy of the price level a desirable interest rate rule should involve a
feedback from endogenous variables such as inﬂation and a variable related to
real activity.
The benchmark model employed in almost all the literature here considered
can be represented by the following equations, taken from Rotemberg and Wood-
ford (RW, henceforth):
βEte πt+1 = e πt − ke yt (3)
σEte πt+1 + Ete yt+1 = σe it + e yt + gn
t (4)Challenges for Monetary Policy and the Enlarged Euroland 11
The model (3)-(4) is expressed in log-linear context, and it has to be intended
as the reduced form from a more complex model including the First Order Con-
ditions of households and ﬁrms together with their respective constraints. So,
e πt = πt − π, e yt = yt − y,w i t hπ, y steady state levels for the inﬂation rate and
output, respectively5. In (3)-(4), πt is the (log of) inﬂation rate, while yt is the
output gap, it is the nominal rate, controlled by Central Bank; gn
t is an exogenous
stochastic disturbance.
Equation (3) is the aggregate supply equation in expected inﬂation and is
derived from price optimization from the ﬁrm’s side. Parameters of the model
are: β, the representative agent’s discount factor, and σ, the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution across goods. In particular, parameter k reﬂects the
presence of rigidities in the model: higher k, more rigid is considered the economy.
In fact, k is a function of the parameters describing the price rigidities of the
model: in RW, k is a function of the frequency of price adjustment. It also
possible to show that the functional form for AS (3) is similar for other methods
of price adjustments, like for example, the cost of price adjustment. Equation
(4) is the linearized version of the intertemporal IS equation: it relates spending
decisions from private agents to interest rate levels.
The model is closed by the inclusion of a monetary policy rule on the variants
of equation (2), like for example: e it = φπe πt + φye yt, where nominal rate is set
as reacting to inﬂation rate and output gap, which, given (3)-(4), are the only
endogneous variables. In a model without rigidities, the presence of e yt in this rule
can be redundant: output gap stabilization implies also inﬂation stabilization,
and vice-versa. In fact, after solving forward AS equation (3) we get:




From (5) we see that output stabilization also delivers inﬂation stabilization.
5Variables are expressed in logs.Challenges for Monetary Policy and the Enlarged Euroland 12
Therefore, in what cases, do we need a mixed target for both inﬂation and output
? This can occur if the deviations of output from its steady state are persistent
over time, as for example:
e yt = ρe yt−1 + εt (6)
with E (εt)=0 , Va r(εt)=σ2
ε.B y u s i n g (5) together with (6) we get:
e πt =
(ρe yt−1 + εt)
1 − βρ




Thus, if ρ>0, a central bank should work more actively on managing the inﬂation
rate in order to keep output at its full capacity level. The persistence in output
sinthetically represented by (6) can be originated because of the presence of real
rigidities. Higher is the number of real rigidities in the model, more complex will
be the persistence of the inﬂation rate. The Taylor principle in its simplest form
is expressed by setting the coeﬃcients of policy function (??)e q u a lt oφπ =1 .5;
φy =0 .5. Of course, the adoption of a speciﬁc rule, calls for further reﬁnements,
since it turns out to be natural to ask: can we do better ?
In general, given the presence of lot of persistency in interest rate movements,
another natural candidate is a rule with the presence of interest rate smoothing
obtained by setting φi 6=0 ,w i t hTi =0 , in (2). This can be justiﬁed from the
need to assure a smooth reaction of ﬁnancial markets: smooth interest changes
from monetary authority implies smooth reaction of ﬁnancial markets.
In any case, all the possible articulations of monetary policy rules call several
questions that should be addressed via a proper set up of modelling framework.
It is then natural to ask whether the variables included in the various variants
of (2) are the ones which make sense. Is it desirable to have a prompt response
of interest rate of the sort described above ? If this is true, how exactly these
variables should be deﬁned ? What is the correct price index to be employed as
a measure for the inﬂation and/or for the expected inﬂation ? Should we include
the actual output or the output gap ? With respect to output gap, how should itChallenges for Monetary Policy and the Enlarged Euroland 13
be measured ? What are the values for the coeﬃcients of monetary policy rules
that can deliver at the same time determinacy and full control of the inﬂation
rate ?
These and other questions are at the basis of the empirical and theoretical
work which stimulated this new body of literature on Monetary Policy.
5. General Comments
In general, the weak point of the models considered in this literature can be
condensed in few points:
1. Scarce attention to statistical ﬁt.
2. Welfare analysis not accurate.
3. Lack of attention to Government Budget Constraint.
4. Absence of role for capital accumulation
With respect to the ﬁrst observation, many models collected in this volume
claim to make extensive reference to the empirical grounds. However, scarce eﬀort
has been dedicated to test how close are the models to real data. This appears to
be an important drawback, especially because the models here considered aims to
be useful to provide policy recommendations. Another rudimentary attempt to
be as close as possible to data is done by McCallum and Nelson: they compute
the volatility of {y,i,π}, derived from speciﬁc assumptions on the coeﬃcients of
the monetary policy rules.
An explicit welfare analysis has been considered only by Rotemberg and
Woodford (1999) (RW, henceforth) and it is based on the level of the utility of the
representative agent achieved under various policy conﬁgurations. In this paper,
welfare evaluations is conducted via the manipulation of the ﬁrst order solution
of the model (First Order Conditions and constraints). This way of computingChallenges for Monetary Policy and the Enlarged Euroland 14
welfare comparisons is legitimate only under very speciﬁc assumptions which al-
low to get an analytic expression of the utility function. The crucial assumption
under discussion is given by the optimality of the steady state around which the
model is linearized in order to be solved. Under these assumptions, RW obtain
an accurate Second Order welfare evaluation. In order to have a fully general
welfare evaluation approach, it should be necessary to fully solve the model up
to second order6.
A third limit of the approaches taken in the present framework has to do with
the way by which money is inserted into the model. In all papers collected in the
Taylor volume, money is inserted as an argument of the utility function, assumed
to be strongly separable. Although Feenstra (1986) has proven the equivalence
between money in the utility, Cash in Advance approach, and transaction cost
approach, each of these methods raises problematic economic interpretations.
Money in the utility does not have a good economic appeal, because of the dif-
ﬁculties involved in interpreting money demand shocks, generally considered as
preferences shocks. Transaction costs approach, as in Sims (1994), is probably
more appealing: money demand shocks can be interpreted as transaction cost
shocks.
Another serious shortcoming is represented by the lack of attention paid to the
role of Government Budget Constraint. As discussed by the contributions on the
Fiscal Theory of the Price Levels (see, in particular, Leeper, 1991, Sims, 1994),
monetary policy cannot be considered as permanently detached from ﬁscal policy:
a determinate equilibrium for both inﬂation and level of debt can be speciﬁed in
a n do n l yi faﬁscal policy reaction function is considered in the model.
Another drawback is given by the lack of analysis for capital accumulation.
The only exception to this is given by the model by McCallum and Nelson, where
an exogenous stochastic process for the investment gives the appearance of an en-
6See Sims (2001), and Schmitt-Grohè and Uribe (2001).Challenges for Monetary Policy and the Enlarged Euroland 15
dogenous investment choice. This appears to be a serious shortcoming, especially
if we think that a monetary policy rule to be eﬀective should be able to modify
expenditure decision of agents, which are aﬀected by real interest rate. Thus,
without a proper design of the intertemporal investment decision which should
make real rate endogenous, it is diﬃcult to accurately judge the performance of
monetary policy rules.
On the empirical grounds, the papers collected in this volume are based on
the presumption that it is possible to recover the policy behavior by identifying
single equation models. In some cases, a recursive VAR model is estimated by
assuming that interest rate enters the non-policy block with a lag and that all the
variables entering the interest rate equation are predetermined: an OLS estimate
will deliver the monetary policy reaction function. However, it has been shown
(see Sims, 1999), that this approach is correct as long as the model is estimated
by using post-war data, because it is widely recognized that in this period all
central banks adopted truly nominal interest rate targeting rules.
These drawbacks are based on the uncritical acceptance that during 1979-
1982 monetary authority changed reaction function. This is not entirely correct,
because a Taylor rule model appears to unﬁt data only in the inter-war period.
The only phenomena clearly detected during the period 1979:10-1982:12 was the
bigger unpredictability of the Federal Funds Rate, if compared to the preceding
and following periods. Even if point estimate show diﬀerent coeﬃcients (bigger
values for the inﬂation targeting after 1982), this cannot be tested with certainty
given the noise contained in the sub-samples. This reveals the fallacy of relying
only on a single equation models to recover policy behavior, given also that fact
that nominal interest rate enters many equation in a structural model.Challenges for Monetary Policy and the Enlarged Euroland 16
6. Monetary Policy in Euroland with the Accession Countries
It is certainly true that the major challenge that European Central Bank is going
to face is given by the enlargement. In this new context, in fact, the probability
of dealing with asymmetric shocks will increase dramatically. It may happen for
example, that some countries may experience deﬂationary pressures and other
countries at the same time may experience economic booms.
It is not certain that the increase of the integration among the countries
will reduce the potential for asymmetric shocks. It has to be remarked that the
enlarged economic union will face more asymmetric shocks that the less integrated
one. In fact some of the original members can ﬁnd themselves as outliers in terms
of inﬂation and output if compared to the average that the ECB is going to target.
Therefore, those countries may ﬁnd that the cost-beneﬁt calculus of the union
has become less favorable for them.
In this new framework the ECB is in trouble. The only fact that can be
implemented is related with the opportunity that each countries has the necessary
tools to deal with the asymmetries present in the new context.
The diﬃculties can be also well described when we think about the decision
making process in the enlarged governing council of ECB. At the moment, the
governing council has representatives of the 12 original member countries. After
the enlargement the governing council will be characterized by 27 members. Each
governor representing his country will have a diﬀerent set of perceptions about
what should be the ‘desirable’ inﬂation rate and output target. The nice aspect
of this is the Governing Council will ﬁxt h ei n t e r e s tr a t et h a ti ti so p t i m a lf o rt h e
system as a whole, even if each governor is concerned with the economic conditions
in his country. Basically, in the decision making process the Governing Council
will be forced to adopt a median voter approach and the resulting interest rate
to be settled is given by that level preferred by the median voter among the 27
members.Challenges for Monetary Policy and the Enlarged Euroland 17
It is possible to show (see De Grauwe, 2002) that during the past year the
decision of the European Governing council has been set in order to satisfy the
best interest of the Euroland as a whole. This has been true even if each member
of the governing council is strongly interest in the favoring an interest rate which
takes into account the needs of his (her) own country. Therefore there is not a big
discrepancy between what each governor thinks to be optimal for his country and
what it is optimal for the Euroland as a whole. In fact Germany, Italy, France
Spain represents more than 70 per cent of the total Euroland territory: so the
large countries interest turn out to be well respected y the decision of the ECB.
Therefore in the original system, a consensus can be easily reached around the
proposals and the ﬁnal decision is rarely taken with a vote.
When the accession countries will have joined Europe the situation appears
to be quite diﬀerent. In fact, it is possible to imagine a set of coalitions formed
by small countries and this can overcome the desired decision of bigger countries.
In this new framework, it is possible that the national economic conditions in the
decision making process will become important. Thus, in an enlarged Eurosystem
the proposals of the ECB board can be overruled by a group of small countries
which are characterized by a set of economic conditions diﬀerent from the average.
The conclusion of that is the interest rate decisions can be made on the basis of
the economic conditions prevailing in a relatively small part of the Euroland.
To avoid this problem, it would be necessary to set up a reform in such a
way the position of small countries can be taken into account according to their
eﬀective economic importance within the enlarged Euroland.
One possible solution could be to adopt the US Federal Reserve Rule: all
the governors of the enlarged Euroland can participate in the deliberation of
the Governing Council, but voting rights are restricted to a limited number of
governors (ten) on a rotating basis.
Another possible solution can be the IMF criteria: the small countries can beChallenges for Monetary Policy and the Enlarged Euroland 18
grouped together and can be represented by one governor.
We do think that the ﬁrst formula (the US Fed) is respectful of the interest of
the small countries because of rotation of the voting rights. On the other hand,
probably the more eﬃcient solution can be based on the a combination of both
solution, allowing small countries to have a representative with voting rights on
a rotating basis.
7. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we discussed several issues about critical aspects of monetary policy
with a special emphasis to the challenged that ECB needs to face with the ac-
cession of new countries into the Euroland. Apart from the structural problems
that the current monetary modelling framework shows, we have showed that the
ECB will suﬀer of a problem of implementability of policies, since the enlargement
could create the risk that loses its strategic position in realizing monetary policy.
This can be mitigate by creating a council with diﬀerent types of decision rules
in the Governing Council, with the scope of mitigating the power of the small
countries.
References
[1] Boﬁnger, Peter, (2001), Monetary Policy: Goals, Institutions Strategies and
Instruments,O x f o r dU n i v e r s i t yP r e s s ,O x f o r d ,U K .
[2] Calvo, Guillermo, (1983), "Staggered Prices in a Utility-Maximizing Frame-
work", Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 383-98.
[3] Christiano, Larry, J., Eichenbaum, Martin and Charles.L. Evans, (2001),
"Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Eﬀects of a Schock to Monetary Pol-
icy", NBER W.P. No. 8403, July.Challenges for Monetary Policy and the Enlarged Euroland 19
[4] Cho, J.-O. and Thomas, F. Cooley, (1995), "The Business Cycle with Nom-
inal Contracts", Economic Theory, 6, 13-33.
[5] De Grauwe, Paul, (2002), "Challenges for Moentary Policy in Euroland",
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 4, 693-718.
[6] Dunlop, John, T., (1938), "The Movement of Real and Money Wage Rates",
Economic Journal, 48, 413-94, reprinted in Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, 12(2), 1998, 223-34.
[7] Feenstra, Robert, C., (1986), "Functional Equivalence Between Liquidity
Costs and the Utility of Money", Journal of Monetary Economics, 17, 271-
91.
[8] Goodfriend, Marvin, and Robert, G., King, (1997), "The New Neoclassi-
cal Synthesis and the Role of Monetary Policy", in B. Bernanke and J.J.
Rotemberg, (eds.), NBER Macroeconomic Annual, the MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, MA.
[9] Ireland, Peter, N., (1997), "A Small, Structural, Quarterly Model for Mon-
e t a r yP o l i c yE v a l u a t i o n " ,Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public
Policy, 47, 83-108.
[10] Kim, Jinill, (2000), "Constructing and Estimating a Realistic Optimizing
M o d e lo fM o n e t a r yP o l i c y " ,Journal of Monetary Economics,4 5( 2 ) ,A p r i l ,
329-59.
[11] King, Robert, G., and Alexander L. Wolman, (1999), "State Dependent Pric-
ing and the General Equilibrium Dynamics of Money and Output", Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 114(2), 655-90.
[12] Leeper, Eric, M., (1991), "Equilibria under ‘Active’ and ‘Passive’ Monetary
and Fiscal Policies", Journal of Monetary Economics, 27, 129-147.Challenges for Monetary Policy and the Enlarged Euroland 20
[13] Ohanian, Lee, E., Alan C. Stockman, and Lutz Killian, (1995), "The Eﬀects
of Real and Monetary Shock in a Business Cycle Model with Some Sticky
Prices", Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 27(4), Part 2, 1209-34.
[14] Rotemberg, Julio, J, (1982), "Sticky Prices in the United States", Journal
of Political Economy, 90, 1187-1211.
[15] Rotemberg, Julio, J. and Michael Woodford, (1997), "An Optimization-
Based Econometric Framework for the Evaluation of Monetary Policy", in
B. Bernanke and J.J. Rotemberg, (eds.), NBER Macroeconomic Annual,t h e
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
[16] Sbordone, Argia, (2001), "An Optimizing Model of U.S. Wage and Price
Dynamics", manuscript, Rutgers University.
[17] Schmitt-Grohé, Stephanie and Martín Uribe, (2001), "Optimal Fiscal and
Monetary Policy Under Sticky Prices", CEPR Working Paper No. 2942.
[18] Sims, Christopher, A., (1994), "A Simple Model to Study the Determina-
tion of the Price Level and the Interaction of Monetary and Fiscal Policy",
Economic Theory, 4, 381-99.
[19] Sims, Christopher, A., (1998), "Stickiness", Carnegie-Rochester Conference
Series on Public Policy.
[20] Sims, Christopher, A., (1999), "The Role of Interest Rate Policy in the
Generation and Propagation of Business Cycles: What has Changed since
30s ?", manuscript, Princeton University.
[21] Sims, Christopher, A., (2001), "Second Order Accurate Solution of Discrete
Time Dynamic Equilibrium Models", processed, Princeton University.
[22] Taylor, John, B., (1999), Monetary Policy Rules, edited by, NBER Confer-
ence Series Report, Chicago University Press, Chicago, IL.Challenges for Monetary Policy and the Enlarged Euroland 21
[23] Tarshis, Lorie, (1938), "Changes in Real and Money Wages", Economic
Journal, 48, 150-4, reprinted in The Keynesian Heritage, ed. by G.K. Shaw,
Vol.2, Schools of Thought in Economics, Series No.1, 1988, Aldershot, U.K.,
Elgar.
[24] Woodford, Michael, (2002), Interest and Prices, in preparation, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, NJ.
[25] Zbaracki, Mark, J., Mark Ritson, Daniel Levy, Shantanu Dutta, and Mark
Bergen, (2000), "The Managerial and Customer Costs of Price Adjustment:
Direct Evidence from Industrial Markets", manuscript, The Wharton School,
University of Pennsylvania.